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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF.UTAH
FRANKLIN D. RICHARDS
Plaintiff and Appellant

vs.

Case No. 8970

ROBERT A. ANDERSON,
Defendant and Respondent
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff commenced an action for damages to his automobile in the city court of Salt Lake City, Utah, where the
court sitting without a jury, granted judgment for plaintiff.
The defendant appealed to the District Court. At the pretrial
conference defendant's motion for summary judgment on the
basis of facts stipulated to by respective counsel was granted
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on the ground that plaintiff was guilty of negligence as a
matter of law. Plaintiff has appealed to this court from said
judgment.
The judgment ( R-5) contains respective counsels stipulations of facts. In addition the plaintiff's affidavit with the
officer's diagram and measurements of the accident and a
report of accident prepared by and bearing the appellant's
signature (Exhibit I) were admitted by stipulation and are
part of the record supporting the judgment.
Appellant has set forth the facts in his brief which
respondent accepts with the following exceptions: At the
pretrial conference it was stipulated that the respondent
stopped at the stop sign and waited for several cars to go
by ( R-5) . Two cars in the outside lanes then stopped to
allow respondent to enter the intersection. (Exhibit I). Re·
spondent then started up from his stopped position and
proceeded in front of the two stopped cars in the center and
out~ide lanes (Exhibit I) (R-5) but collided with appellant's
car 5 feet in the inside lane of traffic after traveling into the
intersection 38 feet. (Officer's diagram.) Respondent
was traveling at a ~peed of 5-10 m.p.h. at impact and appellant
1;). 20 m.p.h. Appellant failed to see respondent until he was
a few feet from him. (R-7)
The ~ole que~tion raised on this appeal is whether upon
the~ faet~ it can be ~aid that appellant was guilty of neglig•·nct' as a matter of law.

STATEl\1ENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THERE \\'AS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE BEFORE
THE COUHT FOR IT TO RULE AS A MATTER OF LAW
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THAT PLAINTIFF WAS GUILTY OF NEGLIGENCE
WHICH PROXIMATELY CONTRIBUTED TO THE ACCIDENT AND PLAINTIFF'S DAMAGE.
(a) PLAINTIFF FAILED TO YIELD THE RIGHT-

OF-WAY TO DEFENDANT.
(b) PLAINTIFF FAILED TO KEEP A PROPER
LOOKOUT.
AR6UMENT
POINT 1
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT. EVIDENCE BEFORE
THE COURT FOR IT TO RULE AS A MATTER OF LAW
THAT PLAINTIFF WAS GUILTY OF NEGLIGENCE
WHICH PROXIMATELY CONTRIBUTED TO THE
ACCIDENT AND PLAINTIFF'S DAMAGE.
(a) PLAINTIFF FAILED TO YIELD THE RIGHT-OF-

WAY TO DEFENDANT.
It is not disput~d that respondent stopped at the stop
sign and waited for several cars to go by. In fact counsel for
appellant contends that respondent waited at the stop sign
so long he became impatient and started out in front of
cars in the right lanes of traffic (Appellant Brief - Page 5).
Appellant filed a Report of Accident and Claim with
respondents insurance carrier, (Exhibit 1) for the damages
to his automobile in which he set forth his own version of how
the accident occurred. His statement contained therein is as
follows: "Anderson started up from stop sign and ran in
front of my car. Cars 1 and 2 stopped to let Anderson in
lane, however, instead of him going in their lane he· pulled
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in front of me." Appellant also included a diagram to show
the stopped cars in the two right lanes.
Section 41-6-74 U.
as follows:

c.· A.

1953 is involved and provides

"Vehicle entering a through highway. The driver
of a vehicle shall stop as required by this act at the
entrance to a through highway and shall yield the
right-of-way to other vehicles which have entered the
intersection from said through highway or which are
approaching so closely on said through highway as to
constitute an immediate hazard, but said driver having so yielded may proceed and the drivers of all
other vehicles approaching the intersection on said
through highway shall yield the right-of-way to the
vehicle so proceeding into or across the through highway.
(b) The driver of a vehicle shall likewise stop in
obedience to a stop sign as required herein at
an intersection where a stop sign is erected at
one or more entrances thereto although not a part
of a through highway and shall proceed cautiously, yielding to vehicles not so obliged to stop
which are within the intersection or approaching
so closely as to constitute an immediate hazard,
but may then proceed."
The question arises as to when a vehicle constitutes an
immediate hazard. In the case of Fusco vs. Dauphin et al,
1950 Delaware 88 A. ( 2d) 813. The court had occasion to
define the term. In that case the plaintiff, a passenger on a
motorcycle, driving along a through highway, was struck
by the truck of the defendant which stopped at the stop sign
before entering the intersection.
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The accident happened near the center of the intersection. There was no evidence as to the distance the plaintiff's
motorcycle was away from the intersection when the truck
started out, but the motorcycle was traveling 15-20' m.p.h.
An immediate hazard statute, similar to the Utah statute,
was involved, and the court, in construing the same, stated as
follows:
"What constitutes an immediate hazard necessarily calls for a construction of Section . 602 of the
City Ordinances. In this connection, also, the true
meaning of the word "yield" in the third line from
the end of the ordinance must be considered.
The driver approaching the stop sign must, of
course, stop. He is in a position to observe on-coming traffic and judge its speed and to determine the
approximate distance and time it would take him to
cross safely. At a proper moment when on-coming
traffic does not create an "immediate hazard," he
may proceed out into the intersection and force opposing traffic to "yield." Now, the word "yield"
carries with it the connotation of giving way to the
extent even of a complete stop. But so to construe the
word in the light of the practical purposes sought to
be accomplished by this ordinance would be completely unrealistic. Such a construction would ( l) conflict with a sensible interpretation of the words "immediate hazard" because if the driver on the favored
street must stop or slow down sharply. to. avoid collision with the disfavored driver, the latter cons~itutes
an "immediate hazard" from a common sense point
of view."* * *
"With these considerations in mind I conclude
that a realistic construction of Section 602 compels
this result: an "immediate hazard" is created when
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a vehicle approaches an intersection on a favored
street at a reasonable speed under such circumstances
that, if the disfavored operator proceeds into the intersection, it forces the former sharply and suddenly
to check his progress or to come to a halt in order to
avoid collision."
In the case of Fisher vs. Wichita Transportation Company, 1943 156 Kan. 500, 134 Pac. (2d) 393, a large bus
traveling at about 3 m.p.h. entered an intersection from the
north, after a stop to discharge a passenger, and then commenced a left turn at about 3 m.p.h. At the time of the commencement of the left turn, the jury found, on special
interrogatories that the plaintiff was approaching the intersection from the south at a distance of 150 feet, traveling
at 21 m.p.h. The plaintiff failed to take any steps to avoid
the accident, although he could have stopped or turned out.
The jury found specifically that the bus failed to yield the
right-of-way, and that the plaintiff's vehicle was so close as to
constitute an immediate hazard when the bus was in the intersections intending to make a left turn.
Judgment was entered on the general verdict and the
defendant appealed.
On appeal the appellate court held the plaintiff was not
an immediate hazard and cited the case of Rouleau vs.
Blotner 84 NH 539 152 A 916, and quoted the following
from the Rouleau case:
"The defendant's truck which had come from the
north started to make a left turn at a street intersection. It was moving at five miles per hour. Plaintiff
in his automobile was coming toward the intersection
from the opposite direction. Plaintiff's car was 150
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feet south when defendant's truck was. making the
turn. A collision followed and plaintiff recovered
damages, but the verdict was set aside on appeal and
judgment directed for defendant. In the opinion it
was said "the only other claim of fault is the general
ground that it was careless to attempt to make the turn
when and as the defendant's servant did. Traffic
has the right to move in a reasonable way,· and a
driver may rely upon the proposition that other drivers will use due care unless there be something to
inform him that such is not the fact."
"The large truck was an object which could not
escape the observation of an;y on-coming careful
driver. The plaintiff's car was at least 150 feet distant when its driver would see the truck turning across
his path if he looked. The intervening distance was
sufficient several times over for him to stop. Moreover, he did not need to stop. If he had slowed
down, he would have passed to the rear of the truck
while still going at a moderate rate of speed for a
thickly settled village street."
"We agree with this decision of the New Hampshire Court. It would not create an "immediate hazard" for the driver of Defendants' bus to make a left
turn when Plaintiff was coming from the approximate distance of 150 feet south of the intersection as
the bus commenced to make its turn."
The question is whether or not the appellant's vehicle
constituted an immediate hazard to the respondent's vehicle
within the meaning of the statute after the respondent's
vehicle had come to a stop at the stop sign. (It has been
stipulated that respondent entered the intersection first.) It
is certain that appellant's vehicle did not constitute an immediate hazard to respondent's vehicle when respondent
first brought his vehicle to a stop at the entrance to the high-
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way, for respondent was at the stop sign while several cars preceding the appellant's car passed the intersection.
. Having so yielded to cars then within the intersection, or
approaching so closely as to constitute an immediate hazard, .the respondent then had a right, under the statute to
proceed and the drivers of all other vehicles approaching the
intersection were required to yield the right-of-way to respondent proceeding into the intersection.
In this instance, two drivers, one in the center and one
in outside .lane, stopped, either in compliance with their duty
to yield the right of way to respondent, or voluntarily relinqU:ished any. right they may have had, and afforded the
respondent an opportunity to enter and cross the intersection.
The appellant however passed the two cars on his right, failed
to yield the right of way, and further failed to heed the warning signal constituted by the two stopped or stopping cars on
his right.
In the stipulated facts set forth in the judgment it is
stated as follows: ". . . that after first having made a stop
and .waited, the defendant then proceeded into the intersection and that a car in the center lane for west-bound traffic
caTTle to a stop for the defendant prior to the defendant's
entry on to 5th South Street. (Underlining ours.) (R-5)
The respondent entered the intersection from a stopped
position and attained a maximum speed of 5-10 m.p.h. by the
time he traveled· the 38 feet into the intersection to the point
of i·mpact. Appellant acknowledges a speed of 15-20 m.p.h.
at the time he entered the intersection and as he approached,
and ' he would therefore be several times as far from the
point of impact, which occurred 10 feet west of the east side
of the intersection, as respondent when he entered the intersection. As respondent started out, the appellant had in the
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lane immediately to his right a stopped car, waiting for
respondent to travel in front of him. This car was almost
as cle::r a signal of danger as would he the clear unobstructed
view of respondent's vehicle moving across the intersection.
At the distance which appellant had to he from the intersection when respondent started out, it is difficult to understand how appellant failed to see respondent if appellant had
kept a proper lookout.
There can he little doubt hut that appellant could have
brought his vehicle .to a complete stop with lots of room to
spare after respondent entered the intersection and prior to
his arrival at the point of impact, for at 15 m.p.h., even on
damp asphalt, it would have taken only 15-17 feet for appellant to have brought his vehicle to a stop ·after observing
danger and at 20 m.p.h. 24-28 feet. (Utah Highway Patrol
Speed Calculator). The appellant's vehicle did not, therefore, constitute an immediate hazard to the vehicle of the
respondent and the respondent's vehicle clearly had the
right of way as between the two vehicles. Appellant's failure
to yield the right of way constituted negligence as a matter of
law.
(h) PLAINTIFF FAILED TO KEEP A PROPER
LOOKOUT
Respondent traveled a distance of 38 feet into the intersection hut appellant did not see his car until appellant was
a few feet from point of impa-ct. Appellant claims there
were cars in the right and center lanes to the right of appellant which possibly prevented appellant from seeing
respondent's car. Occupying part of that 38 feet were two
vehicles which stopped. for respondent. Each vehicle would.
occupy about 6 feet of space, of that .38 feet, or a total of
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12 feet, leaving a possible 26 feet of unoccupied space across
which respondent traveled when part of his car would be visible to appellant. The closer appellant got to the point of impact the more difficult it would be for him to see between the
two cars, but until he got very close to them he should have
had little difficulty in seeing the respondent's car traversing
the highway in front of him. He was also put on notice of the
approach of the respondent's car by the very fact that the two
cars came to a stop in front of him. He had much more opportunity than either of the two cars on his rightto bring his
vehicle to a stop before colliding with respondent's vehicle.
It is difficult to believe that the appellant, if he had
been keeping a proper lookout, could have completely failed
to see the respondent's vehicle traveling across the intersection and the fact that vehicles in the right lanes were stopped
or stopping in front of him, if he observed them, should
have been a red light signal to him and caused him to proceed with caution past the car so stopped. Even though he
may have been going only 15 miles per hour, as he claims,
if he could not stop within his range of vision, he was traveling too fast for the conditions. When one considers that
the one car at least, in the center lane, was stopped in front
of him as the respondent traveled out from the stop sign and
that the stopped car was directly in appellant's line of vision,
it becomes difficult to envision that appellant could have been
keeping any lookout at all or paying attention to his driving.
He had several seconds within which to observe and react to
the situation in front of him.
In Conklin v. Walsh, 113 Utah 276, 193 P. (2d) 437,
this court held a driver on an arterial highway guilty of
negligence as a matter of law in failing to re-ohserve the
plaintiff£ vehicle after it had stopped at a stop sign and pro-
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ceeded into the intersection, the defendant being at the time
of his first observation about 1;4 block away ( approx. 165
feet) traveling 30-45 miles per hour. This Court stated:
"Neither driver can excuse his own failure to
observe because the other driver failed in his duty.
Neither driver is at any time to be excused for want
of vigilance or failure to see what is Jl!ain to be
seen. Drivers are permitted to cross over arterial
highways after having stopped. True, they must
yield the right of way to cars which are close enough
to constitute an immediate hazard. This rule, however,
requires the exercise of some judgment. There is still a
duty on the part of the driver traveling the arterial
highway to remain reasonably alert to the possibility
of the disfavored driver starting across the intersection in the belief that he can cross in safety. The
duty of keeping a proper lookout attends all those
operating motor vehicles and other rules of the road
do not relieve any driver of the necessity of complying with this requirement."
In Mingus v. Olsson, 114 Utah. 505, 201 P. (2d) 495,
this Court held a pedestrian to be guilty of contributory
negligence as a matter of law in failing to keep a proper
lookout, notwithstanding the fact that he was in a crosswalk
and had the right of way over defendant's vehicle, saying:
"A pedestrian crossing a public street in a crosswalk or pedestrian lane, although he may have the
right of way over vehicular traffic, nonetheless has
the duty to observe for such traffic. Clearly, decedent neglected the duty in this case. It follows that he
was contributorily negligent as a matter of law. Of
course we do not mean to imply that a mere glance
in the direction of the approaching automobile would
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suffice. The duty to look has inherent in it the duty
to see what is there to be seen, and to pay heed to it."
(Underlining ours)
As has been previously stated, this accident took place
at a T intersection. There was no place but forward and
to the right, from which direction respondent's vehicle was
approaching, to demand appellant's attention. His failure
to see what was there to he seen and to pay heed to it
constituted negligence as a matter of law.

CONCLUSION
There was clearly sufficient evidence before the trial
court for it to rule that appellant was guilty of negligence
which proximately caused or contributed to the accident as
a matter of law. Furthermore, the evidence conclusively
and as a matter of law showed that appellant was guilty of
contributory negligence. The lower court, therefore, properly granted the respondent's motion for summary judgment
and the judgment should he affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
RICH & STRONG and
LAWRENCE L. SUMMERHAYS,

Attorneys for Defendant
and Respondent.
604 Boston Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah
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